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bstract
This paper introduces a new dataset on the stock and structure of domestic debt in 36 Low-Income Countries over the period 1971–2011. We
haracterize the recent trends regarding LICs domestic public debt and explore the relevance of different arguments put forward on the benefits and
osts of government borrowing in local public debt markets. The main stylized fact emerging from the data is the increase in domestic government
ebt since 1996. We also observe that poor countries have been able to increase the share of long-term instruments over time and that the maturity
engthening went together with a decrease in borrowing costs. However, the concentration of the investor base, mainly dominated by commercial
anks and the Central Bank, may crowd out lending to the private sector.
 2014 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. 
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.  Introduction
Analyses on government borrowing and debt management
n Low-Income Countries (LICs) have traditionally focused on
xternal debt. This scarcity of studies is partly due to the lack of
 comprehensive database on domestic public debt and the his-
orical prominence of external borrowing compared to domestic
orrowing. Until recently, in fact, foreign liabilities have been
he largest component of the public debt in LICs, the target of
ebt relief initiatives such as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.HIPC) and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), and the
ain concern of the joint Fund/Bank Debt Sustainability Frame-
ork for LICs (LIC DSF). In recent years, however, LICs made
ubstantial efforts to develop their local public debt markets and
elied heavily on domestic sources to finance budget deficits
uring the global crisis, sparking the attention of International
inancial Institutions (IFIs) and the academic community.
Because of the constraints indicated above, the existing lit-
rature on government borrowing in LICs is relative scant and
nconclusive with regard to the benefits and cost of domestic
iabilities relative to foreign liabilities. Only few studies assess
mpirically the rationale (if any) for LIC governments to gradu-
lly shift their financing strategies toward domestic sources and
way from external sources.
At any rate, domestic financing is plenty of advantages. The
iterature on public debt management in Emerging Markets
EMs) has shown that, in general, market depth has increased,
aturities have lengthened and the investor base has broad-
ned (Mehrotra et al., 2012). As a result, domestic debt may
ring some prominent benefits: the lower exposure of the
ublic debt portfolio to currency risk if and when the domes-
ic debt is denominated in local currency (Hausmann et al.,
006; Bacchiocchi and Missale, 2012); a lower vulnerabil-
ty to capital flow reversals (Calvo, 2005); the possibility to
ndertake countercyclical monetary policy to mitigate the effect
f external shocks (Mehrotra et al., 2012); and the improved
nstitutional infrastructure underlying the organization and func-
ioning of local financial markets (Arnone and Presbitero,
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010). In general, long-term domestic currency-denominated
ebt reduces maturity and currency mismatches and hence tends
o be safer.
However, the literature also stresses that domestic borrow-
ng brings benefits only in the presence of a sound institutional
nd macroeconomic framework, and only if the debt structure
eatures certain characteristics (Abbas and Christensen, 2010;
rnone and Presbitero, 2010; Hausmann et al., 2006; Panizza,
008; Presbitero, 2012b). Many developing countries are, in fact,
nable to issue long-term government securities at a reason-
ble cost, so they are more vulnerable to rollover and interest
ate risks. Moreover, domestic currency-denominated debt could
ubstitute inflation risk for currency mismatch. The nature of
he credit base may also raise vulnerabilities. Previous studies
nderlie the importance of a diverse investor base for lowering
he cost of government debt and the volatility of market yield,
nd stress that a lenders’ profile strongly biased toward com-
ercial banks might worsen crowding out effects and reduce
he efficiency of the banking system. Yet another aspect of the
ebt structure that influences vulnerability is the type of instru-
ents issued. According to Abbas and Christensen (2010), many
f the benefits of domestic debt market – saving assets, col-
ateral function, benchmark yield curve for private lending –
pply to securitized domestic debt and not to liabilities issued
n captive markets or accumulated due to poor public financial
anagement (such as arrears).
The cost–benefit analysis of financial instruments available
o the government, as described above, is largely discussed with
egards to EMs, while the lack of data on domestic public debt in
ICs – especially the financial terms applied to domestic liabil-
ties – has prevented extending the analysis to poorer countries
long similar lines. In particular, it hindered the possibility of dis-
ussing the rationale for LICs government to increase domestic
orrowing relative to external indebtedness.
Against this backdrop, the main objective of this paper is to fill
he void in the literature by constructing a brand new database on
omestic public debt in LICs. While the existing datasets mainly
rovide information on the stock of domestic debt and interest
ayments, at best, our dataset also includes detailed information
n maturity, currency composition, creditor base, and type of
nstruments. The up-to-date information on domestic debt stock
nd structure is comparable across LICs.
Based on our dataset, this paper characterizes the recent
rends regarding LIC domestic public debt and explores the
elevance of different arguments put forward on the benefits
nd costs of government borrowing in local public debt mar-
ets. The main stylized fact that emerges from the data is
he increase in domestic government debt during the period
996–2011 and its larger burden with respect to external pub-
ic debt, at least since the mid-2000s. Short-term financing is
ainly instrumented through marketable and non-marketable
ecurities held by the banking system. Central Bank advances
o the Treasury, which are typically rolled over, constitute a
elevant source of long-term financing. The breakdown into
IPCs and non-HIPCs highlights significant differences in
he evolution and structure of domestic debt between the two
roups, with HIPCs relying more on Central Bank advances and
t
t
t
tent Finance 4 (2014) 1–19
on-HIPCs making progress in issuing securities and lengthen-
ng maturities.
The paper is structured as follow. Section 2 revises the exist-
ng literature and databases on domestic public debt in LICs.
ection 3 describes our dataset and Section 4 presents some
tylized facts on the evolution and structure of domestic public
ebt. Section 5 concludes.
.  Domestic  public  debt  management
.1.  Fiscal  deﬁcit  ﬁnancing
Fischer and Easterly (1990) identify four different means of
scal deficit financing and associate each of them with the risk of
uilding certain macroeconomic imbalances: (1) printing money
ight fuel inflation, (2) running down foreign exchange reserves
ight trigger an exchange crisis, (3) borrowing abroad might
nd up in an external debt crisis, and (4) borrowing domes-
ically might increase interest rates and lead also to a debt
risis.
In theory, the seignorage revenue the government can expect
o obtain from printing money is non-linear in the inflation
ate, similarly to a conventional Laffer curve. The link between
oney creation and inflation is well-known. In practice, how-
ver, seignorage is often a small source of resources both for
eveloping and developed countries. Empirical evidence shows
hat in normal times, the maximum amount of seignorage rev-
nue collected over an extended period of time is less than 5
ercent of GDP (Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1991). During
scal crisis episodes, the seignorage can become an impor-
ant (albeit temporary) means of deficit financing (Reinhart and
ogoff, 2009). By running down international reserves, instead
f printing money, the government can hope to put off the infla-
ionary effects of a fiscal deficit. This policy is also temporary
ecause it can last just until reserves are depleted, or proba-
ly collapse even earlier as pointed out by the theoretical and
mpirical literature on currency crisis.
Foreign borrowing allows to finance the fiscal deficit without
reating money supply-driven inflationary pressures or crowd-
ng out domestic lending to the private sector. However, external
redit flows tend to be volatile, procyclical, and subject to
udden stops (Calvo, 2005). By providing not only financing
ut also foreign exchange, foreign borrowing may induce a
eal exchange rate appreciation, thus hampering competitive-
ess and possibly lowering investment and economic growth
Rodrik, 2008). External debt is typically denominated in for-
ign currency and this creates additional constraints on monetary
olicy and exchange rate management. For instance, according
o Hausmann (2003), foreign currency-denominated debt lowers
he evaluation of solvency because it heightens the dependence
f debt service on the evolution of the exchange rate, which is
ften volatile and subject to shocks and crises. Cespedes et al.
2004) underline that, when there are currency mismatches in
he balance sheets of local agents, currency devaluations are con-
ractionary since they induce negative net wealth effects. Under
hese circumstances, Hausmann and Rigobon (2003) maintain
hat central banks are reluctant to let the exchange rate float and
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end to intervene aggressively in the foreign exchange market
nd hold more international reserves.
Domestic borrowing, typically denominated in local cur-
ency, does not bring about some complications associated with
xternal credit flows. The most prominent concern, instead, is
he crowding out effect: issuing domestic debt the governments
aps private savings that would otherwise be available to finance
rivate investment. If market-determined interest rates increase,
his may reduce investment demand. And if interest rates are
ontrolled or lenders are reluctant to raise them to avoid adverse
election and moral hazard problems, the domestic government
orrowing can lead to credit rationing and a reduced supply of
unds for private investment.
.2.  Domestic  ﬁnancing  in  LICs
The theoretical literature on government borrowing and pub-
ic debt management in LICs is relatively scant – at least
ompared to advanced economies and Emerging Markets – and
till inconclusive with regard to the benefits and costs of domes-
ic liabilities relative to foreign liabilities. Empirical work, in
articular, has been constrained by the lack of a comprehensive
omestic public debt database and by the traditional emphasis
laced on external borrowing as the main means of fiscal deficit
nancing in poor countries. The few available studies on LIC
overnment debt reviewed in Table A1 gathered data from mul-
iple sources that were deemed adequate for specific analytical
urposes.1 Available data on domestic public debt are there-
ore quite heterogeneous in terms of the criteria to distinguish
omestic and external debt, the definition of public sector, the
ype of government liabilities covered, and the treatment of cer-
ain financial arrangements (e.g., on-lending operations, IMF
ending to central banks under a sovereign guarantee, liabilities
ssued in regional capital markets). Furthermore, to the best of
ur knowledge, no dataset provides information on the structure
f domestic public debt.
Domestic public debt started increasing in LICs from the mid-
990s, in coincidence with an upsurge in financial liberalization
Presbitero, 2012b). Subsequently, in the wake of the debt relief
nitiatives and the recent global financial crisis, the level and
omposition of public debt in LICs have changed, sparking the
ttention of IFIs and the academic community.2
In policy-oriented discussions on government borrowing and
ublic debt management in LICs, a common presumption is that
omestic financing is more expensive and riskier than external
nancing, thus making foreign debt preferable to domestic debt.
upporting this view, Christensen (2005) analyses the structure
1 These sources include the IMF’s Monetary Survey, Staff Reports, and Arti-
le IV Reports; the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and Global
evelopment Finance database; and, if available, the websites of LICs’ central
anks and ministries of finance.
2 In February 2012, the IMF’s and IDA’s Board drew attention to the fiscal vul-
erabilities stemming from an increasing public debt in LICs, and recommended
he development of benchmarks (thresholds) for total public debt in order to
trengthen the LIC DSF and inform policy dialogue with country authorities
IMF-IDA, 2012).
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f public debt in 27 Sub-Saharan African countries and finds
hat domestic debt represents a significant burden to the budget
n terms of interest payments, notwithstanding having a rela-
ively small size. In addition, the author shows that the short-term
aturity of domestic government debt is a source of rollover risk
nd macroeconomic instability, and documents the existence of
rowding out effects on private-sector borrowing.
LICs benefiting from debt relief initiatives have attracted spe-
ial attention of policy makers and researchers because of the
xpectations that these initiatives would help poor countries to
tabilize the economy, strengthen public finances, free budget
esources to finance the provision of social services and infra-
tructure, and implement structural reforms. In their study on
ebt relief and HIPCs, Arnone and Presbitero (2010) analyze the
volution and costs of domestic government debt using a World
ank dataset covering 79 developing countries in 1970–2003.
hey provide evidence that both the stock of domestic pub-
ic debt and the associated interest payments rose in HIPCs
fter receiving relief. Presbitero (2012b) shows that, in fact,
he reliance on internal financing has partially offset the reduc-
ion in external debt granted by multilateral and bilateral debt
elief initiatives. Arnone and Presbitero (2010) argue that such
rends might put forward risks to sustainable economic develop-
ent and thus jeopardize the objective of spurting growth that
otivated granting debt relief in the first place. Furthermore,
hey suggest that the objectives of creating a stable macroeco-
omic environment and developing local financial markets have
ot been reached yet. This should be a concern because the
xperience of EMs since the early 2000s suggests that macro-
conomic stability and financial deepening are necessary for
omestic public debt not to represent yet another factor of vul-
erability (Borensztein et al., 2006). In this regard, Presbitero
2012b) shows that only countries with sound policies and insti-
utions exhibit a pattern of rising domestic public debt and upbeat
acroeconomic performance in terms of greater capital accumu-
ation, stronger output growth, and faster financial development.
uch a salutary correlation is not observed in countries with a
eak institutional environment.
The increasing domestic borrowing in LICs, especially in
hose that benefited from debt relief, begs for an explanation.
ne strand of the literature challenges upfront the common
resumption that domestic financing is costlier than external
nancing in LICs. Abbas (2005) argues that the lack of recur-
ent domestic sovereign defaults in poor countries might be
n insight that servicing domestic debt is actually easier than
epaying foreign debt, and, in a similar vein, Panizza (2008)
aintains that switching the sources of fiscal deficit finan-
ing toward domestic debt might reduce the risk of sovereign
efaults. Another strand moves away from purely cost-risk
onsiderations and emphasizes supply-side constraints: facing
ecreasing foreign aid (including both lending and grants) rel-
tive to development financing needs, LIC governments must
eek for additional domestic funding sources. Some authors
rgue that external credit constraints imposed by private lenders,
r policy conditionality restricting non-concessional foreign
orrowing imposed by IFIs, have reduced the opportunities for
xternal financing and forced LIC governments to tap local
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ublic debt markets (Arnone and Presbitero, 2010).3 Struc-
ural benchmarks in recent IMF programs seek to foster the
evelopment of local markets for government securities, thus
ltimately favoring domestic financing (IMF and World Bank,
001; UNCTAD, 2004; Borensztein et al., 2006; Arnone and
resbitero, 2010). Finally, other studies depart from the hypoth-
sis that LIC governments use domestic public debt mainly for
scal deficit financing, and argue that internal borrowing help
terilizing foreign exchange inflows from foreign aid or natural
esource-based exports, particularly in LICs pursuing an active
xchange rate management but unable or unwilling to use mon-
tary policy for sterilization purposes (Christensen, 2005; Aiyar
t al., 2005).
An alternative rationale for the rising domestic borrowing in
ICs is suggested by the literature on public debt management
n EMs, which also increased reliance on local financial mar-
ets since the early 2000s. Focusing on demand-side factors,
 number of studies investigate an EM government’s preferred
ebt portfolio composition and the cost-risk profile of financial
nstruments available, identifying important pros and cons of
hifting from external to domestic borrowing. To the extent that
nternal financing is denominated in local currency, domestic
ebt reduces the exposure of the public debt portfolio to unantic-
pated movements in the exchange rate (Hausmann et al., 2006;
acchiocchi and Missale, 2012) and ensures a higher degree
f freedom to use the exchange rate as a stabilization mecha-
ism against external shocks, i.e. lower fiscal dominance on the
xchange rate policy (IMF and World Bank, 2001; Kumhof and
anner, 2005). Also, to the extent that domestic debt is owed to
esident creditors, it reduces exposure to capital flow reversals
Calvo, 2005). Domestic borrowing can improve the efficiency
f the allocation of national savings if mobilized resources are
sed to fund public investment and not capital flight or inefficient
elf-investment by savers (Abbas and Christensen, 2010). Build-
ng the institutional infrastructure for the issuance of domestic
ublic debt often supports the organization and functioning of
ocal financial markets (Arnone and Presbitero, 2010).
On the other hand, the literature on EMs explores the disad-
antages of domestic borrowing. Given that many developing
ountries are unable to issue long-term government securities at
 reasonable interest rate, the resulting maturity mismatch can
e worse than the currency mismatch associated with foreign
ebt (Panizza, 2008). Macroeconomic distortions and instability
an be induced by an excessive domestic borrowing, including
rowding out effects (Hanson, 2007; Panizza, 2008; Abbas and
hristensen, 2010; Arnone and Presbitero, 2010) and the associ-
tion of large domestic debts with hyper-inflation episodes and
xternal debt crisis (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Distortions in
3 IMF-supported programs in LICs typically include limits on non-
oncessional external debt, under the Debt Limits Policy (DLP), which seek
o prevent the build-up of unsustainable debt while allowing for adequate exter-
al financing (IMF, 2009). Along the same line, the World Bank lending to
ICs follows the Non-Concessional Borrowing Policy (NCBP), an incentive
echanism aimed at discouraging high-risk countries that receive grants from
ontracting non-concessional external debt (IDA, 2006). Neither the DLP nor
he NCBP apply to domestic public debt.
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he financial system can be also important, particularly the poten-
ially perverse incentives facing financial institutions that invest
n government debt. For instance, banks investing in public debt
re more profitable but less efficient, and they are more likely
o prefer short term portfolio allocation and thus build addi-
ional vulnerabilities; domestic banks and institutional investors
ay be induced by moral suasion to absorb excessive public
ebt (Hauner, 2006; Hanson, 2007; Panizza, 2008; Arnone and
resbitero, 2010).
Some studies focus on the role of macroeconomic, political,
nd institutional factors in determining the composition of total
ublic debt in terms of domestic and external liabilities. Earlier
ontributions in the original sin literature attempt to explain why
xternal liabilities are denominated in a few currencies and why
omestic liabilities are short term (Eichengreen and Hausmann,
999; Eichengreen et al., 2004; Hausmann and Panizza, 2003;
eanne, 2003; Mehl and Reynaud, 2005). Guscina (2008) finds
hat in EMs, low and stable inflation and deep financial mar-
ets are associated with a higher share of domestic liabilities
n the public debt portfolio of the central government. Along
he same line, Diuof and Dufrense (2012) study the security
arket in the WAEMU and identify demand- and supply-side
actors that might hamper the issuance of long-term domestic
ebt instruments.
While these arguments are largely discussed with regard to
Ms, the lack of data on domestic public debt, especially with
egard to financing terms applied to domestic liabilities, has
revented extending the analysis to LICs along similar lines.
At a macroeconomic level, the balance of costs and bene-
ts of domestic borrowing in LICs could be reflected in the
ffect of domestic public debt on economic growth. To the best
f our knowledge, Abbas and Christensen (2010) is the only
aper that explicitly addresses this issue in a sample of develop-
ng countries that includes a sufficiently large number of LICs.
he authors find that domestic public debt has a positive impact
n output growth provided that it does not exceed 35 per cent
f bank deposits; above this threshold, debt undermines eco-
omic activity through crowding out effects and inflationary
ressures. The financing terms applied to government liabili-
ies also matter: the growth effect of domestic public debt is
igher for marketable instruments that bear positive real interest
ates and are held by non-bank investors.4
.  Domestic  public  debt  in  LICs:  a  new  dataset
The Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM) pre-
ared by the IMF (IMF, 2001) defines debt as “all  liabilities
hat require  payments  of  interest  and/or  principal  by  the  debtor
o the  creditor  at  a date  or  dates  in  the  future.  Thus,  all  liabilities
4 Presbitero (2012a) investigates the impact of total (external and domestic)
ublic debt on output growth in a sample of 92 developing countries and finds
hat debt has a negative impact on growth up to a threshold of 90 percent of GDP,
eyond which the effect becomes irrelevant. This non-linear effect is consistent
ith debt hindering growth only in countries with sound macroeconomic policies
nd stable institutions. By contrast, in countries where macroeconomic policies
re weak, these are likely to be the first-order constrain on growth.
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n  the  GFS  system  are  debt  except  for  shares  and  other  equity
nd ﬁnancial  derivatives”. The definition of domestic debt, as
pposed to external debt, is not unique and three criteria are com-
on in practice. On a creditor residency basis, debt is domestic
f owed to residents.5 This criterion is widely used in the compi-
ation of statistical information on government debt by official
gencies following the GFSM (IMF, 2001), and is relevant to
tudy international risk sharing and resource transfers between
esidents and non-residents. On a currency basis, debt is domes-
ic if denominated in local currency. This definition enables
he analysis of currency mismatch and vulnerabilities associ-
ted with the currency composition of the public debt portfolio.
inally, on a jurisdiction basis, debt is domestic if issued in local
nancial markets and subjected to the jurisdiction of a local
ourt. This definition helps recognizing the implications of debt
estructuring procedures.6 Defining unambiguously domestic
ersus external debt is crucial, since the debt definition affects
he identification of vulnerabilities and the conclusions drawn
rom empirical studies (Panizza, 2008).
Other dimensions are also relevant to characterize the public-
ector domestic debt, most notably the definition of public
ector (i.e., Central Government, General Government, or Public
ector)7 and the type of financial liabilities included in the debt
tatistics (i.e., market versus non-marketable instruments). In
ICs, the Central Government debt is typically better recorded
nd thus most studies focus on it.8 Similarly, marketable debt
nstruments are usually better reported than other government
iabilities. Information on domestic debts instrumented through
oans, securities,9 and other accounts payable (e.g., Central Bank
5 The concept of residence in the GFSM (IMF, 2001) is not based on nationality
r legal criteria, but on economic interest: an institutional unit is said to be a
esident unit of a certain country when it has a center of economic interest in the
erritory of that country. A similar concept of residence is used in the 1993 United
ations System of National Account, the Fifth Edition of the IMF Balance of
ayment Manual, and in the IMF Monetary and Financial Statistics.
6 According to Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006), sovereign bonds come
ith an array of contractual features, e.g., covenants, commitments to undertake
or not) certain actions over lifetime of the bond, remedies in the event that
ontractual obligations are breached, and procedures for modifying the contract.
ontractual clauses often differ according to the law under which the sovereign
onds fall and hence they have different implications for the scope and term of
ebt restructurings.
7 In the GFSM (IMF, 2001), the General Government consists of all the gov-
rnments units as well as the non-market non-for-profit institutions controlled
nd financed by government units. The General Government can be classified in:
i) Central Government, whose authority extends over the entire territory of the
ountry; (ii) State Government, whose authority extends over the largest geo-
raphic area into which a country may be divided for political or administrative
urposes; and (iii) Local Government, whose authority is restricted to the small-
st geographic areas distinguished for political or administrative purposes. The
ublic Sector includes the General Government, the Public Corporations con-
rolled by government units that engage in financial and non-financial activities,
nd the Central Bank.
8 However, this implies that for countries that are highly decentralized with
ubnational governments that do borrow, or for countries that have large state-
wned enterprises that issue debt, the central government debt is likely to
nderestimate the public-sector liabilities.
9 According to the Handbook of Securities Statistics (BIS, European Central
ank, IMF, 2009), a security is a negotiable financial instrument whose legal
wnership is transferable from one owner to another by delivery or endorsement.
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dvances) is relatively more accessible and transparent than on
nsurance technical reserves and financial derivatives.10
Our domestic public debt dataset comprises 40 low and
ower-middle-income countries over the period 1971–2011 (see
able A2).11 Following the GFSM (IMF, 2001), we adopt the
esidency basis to define domestic debt in 35 countries, whereas
he currency basis is used in five countries because of their debt
ecording practices and data constraints. We include all domes-
ic financial liabilities defined by the GFSM (IMF, 2001), with
he exception of arrears, and focus on the Central Government
ebt as most other studies in the literature.12 As a novelty, our
ataset contains information on the level and structure of domes-
ic public debt: along with the stock of domestic public debt, we
ather data on on-budget interest payments, type of instruments,
aturity, and investor base.13
Among the 40 countries, 33 are classified as LICs and 7 as
ower-middle income countries. There are 38 countries ben-
fiting from IDA lending (denoted IDA-only countries) and
 receiving a mix of IDA and IBRD lending (denoted blend
ountries). HIPCs are two-thirds of the sampled countries. In
erms of geographic location, 29 countries are in Sub-Sahara
frica, 5 in East Asia and Pacific, 2 in Europe and Central Asia,
 in South Asia, one in Latin America and the Caribbean, and
ne in Middle East and North Africa.
As expected when dealing with LICs, the data availabil-
ty is quite heterogeneous across countries and over time. In
ur dataset, accurate information on debt stock exists for 40
ountries whereas data on debt structure is reported for 36
ountries. In addition, the time span of variables included in
he dataset largely differs across countries. We are therefore
onstrained to selectively choose panels of data to conduct
eaningful descriptive analyses and comparisons in Section 4.
hus, we construct two balanced panels covering the period
996–2011: the Debt  Stock  Sample  contains the domestic debt
tock series for 21 countries, and the Debt  Structure  Sample
ncludes data on debt stock and structure for 15 countries. We
lso construct a balanced panel covering the period 2007–2011
 security is designed to be traded on an organized exchange, although actual
rading in secondary markets may not happen.
10 The treatment of government (financial, liquid) assets that leads to the defi-
ition of gross versus net debt is becoming an important issue in EMs. However,
ust a few LICs provide data on net debt and stocks of financial liquid assets that
ould potentially be used to repay maturing debt.
11 Lower-middle-income countries included in our database slightly exceed the
er-capita GNI threshold separating their income category from the low-income
ountries.
12 Reporting of arrears varies largely across countries, e.g., the timing of recor-
ing could be as soon as payments are delayed, or when arrears are audited, or
hen they are settled or securitized. Information on debt owed by subnational
overnments and state-owned enterprises is available for only 7 countries in
 few recent years, thus preventing us from constructing a Public Sector debt
ataset.
13 Our data sources concerning domestic public debt include IMF Staff Reports,
ebsites of countries’ Ministry of Finance and Central Bank, and consultations
ith World Bank country economists, IMF country desks, and debt managers
embers of a network established by the World Bank’s Economic Policy, Debt,
nd Trade Department. Data on external public debt are drawn from the World
ank’s Debt Reporting System (DRS).
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LICs are quite heterogeneous with regard to reliance on
domestic debt, as the box-plot in Fig. 1 and Table A3 suggest.
14 Arnone and Presbitero (2010) argue that the share of domestic debt drasti-
cally increased in HIPCs soon after receiving external debt relief. But the shareFig. 1. Domest
ource: Our elaboration on the LIC domestic public debt dataset.
or the whole sample of 36 countries, the Debt  Structure  Short
ample.
In the next section, we illustrate the evolution of domestic
ublic debt in LICs using the Debt  Stock  Sample  and we ana-
yze the debt structure and financing terms – including on-budget
nterest payments, type of instruments, maturity, and investor
ase – using the Debt  Structure  Sample  and the Debt  Structure
hort Sample. Reported time series are primarily weighted coun-
ry averages, with the GDP in dollars at constant 2005 prices as
eight. We complement the average figures with box-plot analy-
is to assess the data variability across countries in both datasets.
.  Characteristic  of  domestic  public  debt  in  LICs
.1.  Evolution  of  domestic  debt
Fig. 1 shows the evolution of Central Government debt for
he Debt  Stock  Sample  in 1996–2011. On average, LIC external
ebt is much lower than in the past, decreasing from 72 percent
f GDP in 1996 to 23 percent in 2011, whereas LIC domestic
ebt is on the rise, increasing from 12.3 percent of GDP to 16.2
ercent. Both HIPCs and non-HIPCs managed to reduce the
s
f
d
p external debt.
urden of foreign liabilities, particularly the HIPCs benefiting
rom debt relief initiatives that largely wrote off their financial
bligations to official creditors. Trends concerning the domestic
ublic debt, on the other hand, differ between HIPCs and non-
IPCs since the early 2000: HIPCs have reduced domestic debt
ince the peak of 20 percent of GDP in 2002, while non-HIPCs
ave increased it from 12 percent of GDP to 18 percent in the
eriod 2000–2011. Overall, LICs now hold a public debt portfo-
io with a fairly balanced composition in terms of domestic and
xternal liabilities compared to the past. In both HIPCs and non-
IPCs, the public domestic debt represented 40 percent of the
otal public debt in 2011, almost three times the share observed
14lightly decreased since 2006, possibly because HIPCs re-engage in securing
oreign financing to take advantage of the new borrowing space created by the
ebt relief and the lower global interest rates. A scaling-up of public investment
rojects has been observed in some HIPCs (Arnone and Presbitero, 2010).
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or instance, Cambodia has virtually no domestic liabilities and
ritrea has an amount almost equal to its GDP. Most LICs have
ncreased the stock of domestic debt (relative to GDP) since the
id-1990s, but there are exceptions such as Ethiopia, Rwanda,
olomon Islands, and Tanzania, whose level of domestic debt
ecreased. We do not find evidence of LICs uniformly substitut-
ng domestic debt for external debt (or vice versa): the pairwise
orrelations between the ratios of domestic and external debt to
DP in 1996–2011 for each individual LIC, have a positive sign
n some countries and a negative sign in others. Country-specific
ircumstances may then play a role in the pattern of substitution
if any) between local and foreign financing in LICs.
.2.  Financial  cost  and  burden
A main concern about domestic debt relates to its financial
ost and burden relative to external debt. For the Debt  Structure
ample in 1996–2011, Fig. 2 displays implicit interest rates as
roxies of borrowing cost. The nominal implicit interest rate is
alculated as the interest payments in the current year divided
y the average debt stock in the current and preceding year.15
or the domestic debt, we calculate the real implicit interest rate
y subtracting the GDP deflator inflation from the nominal rate.
or the external debt, we add the average depreciation rate of
he local currency against the US dollar and SDR in order to
apture losses (or gains) resulting from exchange rate fluctua-
ions in the presence of foreign currency-denominated external
ebt. On average, the cost of external borrowing never exceeded
 percent per annum and has been always much cheaper than the
ominal cost of domestic borrowing, even including the currency
epreciation losses. The domestic nominal implicit interest rate,
owever, declined significantly from 18 percent per annum in
996 to 8 percent in 2011. On average, the real cost of domestic
orrowing is also lower than in the past and quite often the real
mplicit interest rates are negative and thus encourage borrow-
ng from local sources. Both HIPCs and non-HIPCs achieved
ower nominal borrowing costs in recent years. The domestic
mplicit interest rate is slightly lower in HIPCs as they rely
ore on advances from the Central Bank, which are relatively
nexpensive vis-à-vis other sources of domestic financing.
Fig. 2 also shows simple measures of the financial burden
f public debt in LICs: the interest payments on domestic debt,
nd the interest payments on external debt plus the valuation
ffect induced by exchange rate fluctuations. By construction,
he financial burden of a given type of debt mechanically com-
ines its implicit interest rate (i.e., borrowing cost), its share in
he total public debt (weight), and the size of the public debt
volume). As a consequence of the large reduction in foreign
iabilities relative to GDP and the stability of external borrow-
ng cost, the burden of external debt in LICs fell from nearly 2.2
15 Our choice of using the average debt stock as denominator is justified by
he large share of short-term liabilities in the domestic debt that accrue interests
he same year in which they are issued. Other studies use the current debt stock
s denominator (Christensen, 2005) or the previous debt stock (Arnone and
resbitero, 2010).
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ercent of GDP in the late 1990s to 0.3 percent in recent years.
ICs also experienced a mild drop in the burden of domestic
ebt from 1.7 percent of GDP to 1.3 percent, driven instead by
 cheaper domestic borrowing cost.
On average, therefore, LICs currently face a heavier burden
temming to domestic liabilities compared to foreign liabili-
ies. But the cross-country heterogeneity observed earlier with
egard to reliance on domestic borrowing leads also to varia-
ions in the associated financial burden. For instance, in 2011
alawi and Kenya afforded domestic interest payment around
 percent of GDP, whereas Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, and Togo
aid less than 0.5 percent. More generally, we found a different
attern between HIPCs and non-HIPCs, with the former bene-
ting, since 2005, from a much larger reduction in the domestic
nterest bill than non-HIPCs. Given that the stock of domestic
ebt was not extremely different in the two groups (Fig. 1), the
ower cost of domestic debt in HIPCs may be a side effect of
ebt relief programs, which could have fostered local financial
evelopment and brought down borrowing costs. In addition, the
IPCs took advantage of external debt relief and, after 2000, the
hare of interest payments on external debt quickly converged
o the low values of non-HIPCs.
.3.  Instruments
The structure of domestic public debt in terms of type
f instruments matters. According to Abbas and Christensen
2010), the development of local government debt markets helps
upply a benchmark yield curve for private lending contracts
s well as financial instruments that serve as saving assets and
ollateral vehicles. But these benefits are to be expected from
overnment debt instrumented through securities, not from gov-
rnment debt issued in captive markets or liabilities associated
ith arrears and overdrafts.
For the Debt  Structure  Sample  in 1996–2011, Fig. 3 shows
he composition of the domestic public debt portfolio in terms
f major instruments defined by the GFSM (IMF, 2001),
amely loans, securities, other accounts payable (e.g., Cen-
ral Bank advances), insurance technical reserves, and currency
nd deposits (e.g., judiciary deposits). Securities and Central
ank advances to the Treasury are the main sources of domestic
nancing in LICs. On average, since the early 2000s securi-
ies constitute three-quarters of domestic debt whereas Central
ank advances are nearly one-fifth. The breakdown in HIPCs
nd non-HIPCs reveals a remarkable difference in the structure
f government debt: the share of securities is much higher in
on-HIPCs and, conversely, the share of Central Bank advances
s larger in HIPCs (possibly because their markets are rela-
ively less developed and the pressures of fiscal dominance and
ebt monetization are more acute). Interestingly, we find out an
psurge of Central Bank advances in response to the financial
risis in both groups.
The box-plot in Fig. 3 and Table A3 show differences across
ndividual countries. On average, Kenya, Ghana, and Tanzania
ssue securities exclusively, in contrast to Guinea-Bissau, Haiti,
uinea, and Burundi, in which securities are a small share of
he domestic public debt.
8 G. Bua et al. / Review of Development Finance 4 (2014) 1–19
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tFig. 2. Cost of domes
ource: Our elaboration on the LIC domestic public debt dataset.
.4.  MaturityA common presumption about the choice between domestic
nd external debt is that a government faces a tradeoff con-
erning maturity and currency mismatch: domestic debt is often
(
fi
Hd external borrowing.
enominated in local currency but of shorter maturity relative
o external debt. In fact, many developing countries are unable
or unwilling) to issue long-term government securities in local
nancial markets at a reasonable interest rate (Panizza, 2008;
ausmann and Panizza, 2003; Mehl and Reynaud, 2005).
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The relative share of long- and short-term domestic debt
nstruments could be explained by either demand or sup-
ly factors. The government may hesitate to issue long-term
ebt if the yields curve is sufficiently upward-sloped, so that
orrowing costs increase with tenors. However, even if the
overnment recognizes the benefit of extending the matu-
ity profile, supply-driven factors may limit its ability to do
o. In a volatile macroeconomic environment, the market
ight be not ready or willing to absorb long-term govern-
ent debt in view of significant inflation and default risks
Christensen, 2005). Moreover, the banking system, which
ften dominates the government debt market in LICs, gener-
lly has a strong incentive for buying T-bills, given that these
nstruments provide a regular flow of earnings and have a
rivileged treatment (e.g., a zero credit risk) in the calcula-
ion of risk-based capital adequacy requirements (Diuof and
ufrense, 2012). An investor base lacking mutual funds, pension
unds, and insurance companies, all institutions that typically
ave long-term investment horizons, hampers the possibility
f extending the maturity of public debt. In this regard, it is
 well-established principle that the maturity profile’s length
d
l
Ttype of instrument.
an be viewed as a measure of the degree of market develop-
ent.
For the Debt  Structure  Sample  in 1996–2011, Fig. 4 displays
he composition of the domestic public debt portfolio in terms of
aturity. Long-term (short-term) debt has original maturity of
ore (less) than one year at the date of issuance. In the first panel,
e treat Central Bank advances as long-term liabilities because
n practice they are not callable and can be safely assumed to be
olled over on a continuous basis (even advances that are techni-
ally short-term instruments). In the second panel, we exclude
entral Bank advances altogether from the series of domes-
ic debt and re-calculate the maturity composition. On average,
ICs have managed to lengthen their domestic public debt port-
olio, with the share of long-term liabilities in the total domestic
ebt increasing from 52 percent to 67 percent in 1996–2011. The
aturity lengthening persists even if Central Bank advances are
xcluded. Differentiating between HIPCs and non-HIPCs sug-
ests that the overall increase in the share of long-term has been
riven solely by the later. HIPCs, by contrast, had a relatively
arger share but it has remained quite stable since the mid-1990s.
able A3 shows similar figures for individual countries.
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ource: Our elaboration on the LIC domestic public debt dataset.
.5.  Investor  base
Investors in LIC government debt are few is nature and
ften also in number. Domestic public debt instruments are held
rimarily by commercial banks, the Central Bank, financial insti-
utions in the non-banking system (e.g., mutual funds, pension
unds, and insurance companies), and non-financial institutions
e.g., non-financial corporations and individual investors). The
nvestor base in local financial markets is typically narrow and
ighly concentrated (Arnone and Presbitero, 2010).
Previous studies underlie the benefits of a diverse investor
ase in terms of lowering borrowing costs as well as reducing
arket yield volatility. Broadening the investor base attenu-
tes the monopoly power of a particular group of financial
nstitutions, bringing down interest rates and rollover risks
Christensen, 2005). Larger crowding out effects are to be
xpected when the investor base is strongly biased toward com-
ercial banks. As indicated above, the banking system generallyas a strong incentive for buying government debt and seeking
rofitability in lending to the public sector. This may lead to
elatively weaker incentives to extend credit to riskier private
t
f
st by maturity.
orrowers and even lower efficiency in banking operations and
nancial intermediation (Hauner, 2006). Crowding out effects
re especially harmful in LICs because small- and medium-
ized private companies heavily rely on bank financing, with
egligible (if any) opportunities in corporate bond and stock
arkets.
Other potential distortions in the incentives facing finan-
ial institutions that invest in government debt. First, banks are
ore likely to prefer a short-term portfolio allocation, thus rais-
ng rollover risk for the government. Second, domestic banks
nd institutional investors may be induced by moral suasion to
bsorb excessive public debt, which may amplify the deleterious
ffect of a debt crisis in case the government is following unsus-
ainable policies (Panizza, 2008). Third, a large bank exposure to
overnment securities could undermine the solvency of financial
nstitutions in times of economic distress, potentially leading to
 systematic banking crisis (Diuof and Dufrense, 2012). Dis-
ortions also arise when it is the Central Bank that finances
he government’s short-term cash imbalances through overdraft
acilities for managing daily transactions and cover unexpected
hortfalls in revenue (Johnson, 2001). A higher independence of
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he Central Bank helps lowering the leverage of the government
n borrowing though these facilities.
For the Debt  Structure  Sample  in 1996–2011, Fig. 5 shows
he participation of investors holding the domestic public debt.
n average, the banking system comprising commercial banks
nd the Central Bank holds nearly three-quarters of the domestic
iabilities, with a quite stable participation. Within the banking
ystem, the share of commercial banks has increased since the
arly 2000s. The breakdown into HIPCs and non-HIPCs reveals
hat the former rely much more on Central Bank lending (e.g.,
dvances) whereas the later tap commercial banks and other
arket investors.
.6.  Relationships  between  cost  of  domestic  debt,  maturity,
nd investor  baseUsing the Debt  Structure  Short  Sample, which can be seen as a
onstellation of domestic public debt portfolios for 36 countries
n recent years, the casual inspection of simple correlations
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rovides preliminary evidence on the relationships between cost
f domestic debt, maturity, and investor base.
Fig. 6 (left panel) shows observed pairs of cost of domestic
ublic debt (proxied with the implicit interest rate) and the share
f long-term instruments. The simple correlation between the
wo variables is −0.31 and statistically significant, suggesting
hat debt portfolios of longer maturity face lower cost than debt
ortfolios of shorter maturity. This finding is at odds with the
ommon perception that LICs are unable to issue long-term lia-
ilities at a reasonable interest rate in domestic financial markets.
dmittedly, the observations include countries (mostly HIPCs)
here a large share of public domestic debt is held by the Central
ank, who often lends long and cheap. Excluding the obser-
ations where the Central Bank share exceeds 50 percent in
ig. 6 (right panel), the correlation goes to −0.15 (albeit not
tatistically significant) but it does not become positive, as that
erception would imply.
The negative correlation between the cost and the maturity of
omestic debt would imply that only countries where the average
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ost of debt is low can afford to issue long-term (costlier) debt.
iven that a low nominal implicit interest rate may reflect a more
fficient market or a lower inflation rate, the inverse relationship
etween cost and maturity is consistent with countries with more
eveloped domestic financial markets and better macroecono-
ic policies being able to issue longer term instruments at a
ower cost. This suggests that some LICs are reaping the ben-
fits of developing domestic financial markets and improving
acroeconomic management. In fact, measuring the degree of
nancial development by the savings-to-GDP ratio and the ratio
f credit to the private sector over GDP, we find that the correla-
ion between the implicit interest rate and the share of long-term
omestic debt is negative and significant for countries where the
evelopment of financial markets is above the median, and not
ignificantly different from zero in countries with a low level of
nancial development.16
Fig. 7 presents the relationship between the share of domestic
ublic debt held by investors other than the Central Bank, the cost
f domestic public debt (left panel) and the share of long-term
nstruments (right panel). A positive, statistically significant cor-
elation (0.25) between the non-Central Bank holdings and the
ost of debt is consistent with the view that LIC governments
ith larger reliance on commercial banks and other financial
nstitutions as sources of local funding face higher financial costs
n their domestic liabilities. On the other hand, a negative, sta-
istically significant correlation (−0.33) between non-Central
ank holdings and the share of long-term instruments supports
he view that those LIC governments also bear domestic lia-
ilities of shorter maturity. This finding is consistent with a
16 Specifically, when using the savings-to-GDP ratio, the correlation between
he implicit interest rate and the share of long-term debt is equal to −0.40 for
ountries in which the savings-to-GDP ratio is above the sample median and
o −0.14 (non statistically significant) in countries where the ratio is below the
edia. The corresponding values when using the ratio of credit to the private
ector over GDP are −0.36 (statistically significant) and 0.10 (non statistically
ignificant).
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t is 0.25 in left panel (132 obs.) and −0.33 in right panel (133 obs.)
reference for short-term instruments by commercial banks,
hich in turn might lead to reflect supply-side limits to the
ssuance of long-term debt instruments (Diuof and Dufrense,
012). Panizza (2008) highlights the associated rollover risk
nd macroeconomic vulnerability of such a short-term maturity
rofile.
Correlations identified in Fig. 7 have the expected signs and
re statistically significant. Yet LICs face quite heterogeneous
nancing terms even when they have similar shares of domestic
ublic debt held by non-Central Bank investors. Fig. 8 reports
he distribution of proxy variables of financial cost and matu-
ity of debt portfolios, distinguishing between three groups of
ortfolios: the groups 1, 2, and 3 correspond, respectively, to
ebt portfolios whose share held by non-Central Bank investors
s up to one-third, between one- and two-thirds, and more than
wo-thirds. Mean values of financial cost and maturity variables
o vary across groups, but the overall distributions of these vari-
bles are quite disperse and tend to overlap between groups 2
nd 3.
As a response to the global crisis in 2009, LICs were rec-
mmended to use their available fiscal space to implement
ountercyclical policy responses and support aggregate demand
IMF, 2010). Most LICs did not curtail spending despite of
alling revenues, and those with much stronger pre-crisis macro-
conomic policy buffers even accelerated the growth rate of
eal primary expenditures, including public investment. Bud-
et deficits widened and LICs resorted to domestic and external
nancing to fill the gap. According to IMF (2010), more than
alf of the additional deficit was financed by domestic sources,
ncluding borrowing in local government debt markets, central
ank financing, or drawing down government deposits. Fig. 9
upper panels) indicates that most LICs in our sample indeed
ncreased their public debt relative to GDP between 2007 and
011, and benefited from an implicit cost of domestic borrowing
roadly unchanged. LICs whose share of domestic public debt
eld by non-Central Bank investors was up to one-half in 2007
ended to borrow more from them and so exhibit a higher share
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n 2011 (Fig. 9, lower panels). In a sense, the anti-crisis response
nduced these LICs to rely more on previously untapped domes-
ic sources of financing. On the other hand, LICs with the Central
ank holding relatively more government debt in 2007 did not
ave an homogeneous reaction, as some tended to borrow more
rom the monetary authority and others increased reliance on
arket investors.
.  Conclusions
Several Low-Income Countries are now taking advantage of
ower debt burdens, thanks to the debt relief programs of the
ate 1990s and early 2000s. Since then, they started relying on
 growing basis on internal financing. The change in the com-
osition of financing sources, related also to decreasing foreign
id and increasing foreign direct investment and remittances,
ould have several implications for debt sustainability and for the
caling-up of public investment and poverty-reduction expendi-
ures. In theory, domestic debt could bring several benefits to
ICs, but it could also crowd out private investment and thus
inder the growth process. However, the existing empirical evi-
ence on the balance of costs and benefits of domestic borrowing
n LICs is quite scant.
One of the main limitations that institutions and researchers
ace when dealing with the macroeconomic effects of govern-
ent financing in LICs is poor data quality. In particular, data
n domestic debt in LICs have been so far quite heterogeneous
n terms of definitions and coverage. This paper introduces a
ew dataset on the stock and structure of domestic debt in 40
ICs over the period 1971–2011. With respect to the existing
atasets, this one puts together information on domestic debt in
 way that ensures comparability across countries (definition of
omestic debt, level of public sector, liabilities included) and it
ecollects up-to-date information on domestic debt composition
instruments, maturity structure and investor base). In particu-
ar, we have been able to build two balanced panels covering the
eriod 1996–2011: one with data on domestic debt stock series
or 21 countries, and the other including data also on domestic
ebt structure for 15 countries. In this way, we have been able to
nalyze the evolution of internal financing in poor countries in
he last fifteen years with a certain granularity, as not has been
one so far.
The descriptive analysis of the stock and structure of domes-
ic public debt in LICs highlights some interesting patterns and
Aent Finance 4 (2014) 1–19
dentifies marked differences in the evolution and composition
f government liabilities across countries, especially between
IPCs and non-HIPCs. First, domestic debt increased from 12.3
ercent of GDP in 1996 to 16.2 percent of GDP in 2011, almost
eaching the size of external debt. However, we do not find evi-
ence that LICs uniformly substituted domestic debt for external
ebt. Second, the debt burden on domestic debt is higher that on
xternal debt but it has decreased over time, consistently with
ower borrowing costs due to financial deepening. Third, we
nd that LICs have been able to increase the share of long-term
nstruments over time. Maturity lengthening went together with
 reduction in borrowing costs. This correlation is at odds with
he common perception that LICs are unable to issue long-term
iabilities at a reasonable interest rate, and it suggests that some
ICs are reaping the benefits of developing domestic financial
arkets. Fourth, there is evidence of an increase in the share of
ecurities in government debt, especially for non-HIPCs. How-
ver, Central Bank advances, still important for many HIPCs,
ncreased in response to the global financial crisis. Finally, a
ource of concern is the concentrated investor base, mainly dom-
nated by commercial banks and the Central Bank, which may
rowd out lending to the private sector and undermine financial
tability.
Our preliminary descriptive analysis provides some useful
nsights on the macroeconomic effects of domestic borrowing
n LICs. However, we believe that further research is required
nd our dataset could provide a useful source to better inspect
he tradeoffs that governments in poor countries have to face
hen choosing how to finance public spending. One natural
ay to exploit this dataset is to see how the size of domes-
ic debt is correlated with the characteristic of the economy
e.g., financial development, institutional framework, access to
nternational capital markets) and how the increase in domestic
ebt affects public debt sustainability in LICs. Ongoing research
ork at the World Bank addresses these issues. Second, we think
hat a relevant issue to explore is the extent to which increas-
ng domestic debt affects bank lending to the private sector and
ossible crowds out investment. At the aggregate level, bet-
er data could help to identify the correlations between capital
ows to developing countries, pointing out possible sources of
ulnerability.ppendix  A.
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Table A1
Databases on LIC public debt.
Database Country coverage Domestic debt
definition
Public-sector definition Liabilities included Observations
Christensen
(2005)
27 non-CFA
Sub-Saharan
African countries
(of which 15
LICs) over
1980–2000.
Not defined. Central Government. Domestic debt is defined as gross
securitized government debt
composed of treasury bills,
development stocks, and bonds. It
excludes arrears, advances from the
central bank, and commercial bank
loans.
The dataset has
limited country
coverage. It contains
information on
domestic debt
structure for 15 LICs
up to 2000.
Arnone and
Presbitero
(2010)
79 developing
countries (of
which 17 LICs)
over 1994–2003.
Domestic debt is
defined as debt
owed to creditor
resident in the
same country.
Central Government. Domestic debt is defined as gross
securitized government debt,
including treasury bills, bonds, notes,
and government stocks. It excludes
arrears, advances from the central
bank, commercial bank loans,
debentures, and government
guaranteed debt.
The dataset contains
information on
domestic debt
structure for 17 LICs
up to 2003.
Abbas and
Christensen
(2010)
93 LICs and
emerging markets
over 1970–2007.
Domestic debt is
defined as
domestic currency
debt owed to
domestic citizens.
Central Government. Domestic debt is defined as
commercial bank’s gross claims on
the Central Government plus central
bank liquidity paper.
The dataset excludes
government debt held
by retail investors and
non-banking
institutions.
Abbas et al.
(2010)
174 countries in
1791–2009. For
LICs the data
coverage starts in
1970.
Different
definitions.
General Government (or
Central Government if no
data on General
Government are
available).
It provides data on total public debt
(external plus domestic). Public debt
data are collected from different
sources and liabilities included in the
definition might differ across
countries.
Definitions of public
debt differ across
countries. The paper
does not disaggregate
public debt into
external and domestic.
Panizza (2008) 130 countries over
1990–2007.
Domestic debt is
defined as debt
issued under the
jurisdiction of a
local court.
Central Government (or
General Government if no
data on Central
Government are
available).
It provides data on total public debt
(external and domestic). Public debt
data are collected from different
sources and liabilities included in the
definition might differ across
countries.
Public sector
definition and
liabilities differ across
countries.
Presbitero (2012b) 44 LICs over
1970–2010 (data
are available for
41 LICs).
Different
definitions.
Central Government (or
General Government if no
data on Central
Government are
available).
It provides data on domestic public
debt, collected from different sources
and liabilities included in the
definition might differ across
countries.
This is an extension
and an update of the
Panizza (2008)
dataset.
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Table A2
LIC domestic public debt dataset.
Country name Income
group
Regiona Lending
category
Debt
relief
Domestic debt stockb,c,d Instruments Maturity Investor base Main data
source
Debt stock
sample
Debt structure
sample
Debt structure
short sample
Burundi LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1971–2011 1975–2011 1975–2012 1975–2013 Website x x x
Benin LIC AFR IDA HIPC 2000–2012 2000–2012 2007–2012 n/a IMF x
Burkina Faso LIC AFR IDA HIPC 2003–2011 2003–2011 2003–2011 2003–2011 PRMED x
Bangladesh LIC SA IDA 1998–2011 1998–2011 1998–2011 1998–2011 IMF x
CAR LIC AFR IDA HIPC 2002–2011 2002–2011 2002–2011 2002–2011 IFSe x
Comoros LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1982–2011 n/a n/a n/a IFSf x x
Eritrea LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1995–2008 1995–2010 1995–2010 1995–2010 IFSg x x
Ethiopia LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1988–2010 1988–2010 1988–2010 1988–2010 PRMED x x x
Ghana LMIC AFR IDA HIPC 1981–2011 1982–2011 1981–2011 1996–2011 Website x x x
Guinea LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1995–2011 1995–2011 1995–2011 1995–2011 IMF x x x
The Gambia LIC AFR IDA HIPC 2005–2010 2005–2010 2005–2010 2005–2010 Website x
Guinea Bissau LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1995–2011 1995–2011 1995–2011 1995–2011 IMF x x x
Haiti LIC LAC IDA HIPC 1996–2010 1996–2010 1996–2010 1996–2010 PRMED x x x
Kenya LIC AFR IDA 1977–2011 1977–2010 1982–2010 1977–2010 Website x x x
Kyrgyz LIC ECA IDA 1996–2011 1996–2011 1996–2011 1996–2011 IMF x x x
Cambodia LIC EAP IDA 1993–2011 n/a n/a 1993–2011 IFS x x
Lao PDR LMIC EAP IDA 2006–2011 n/a n/a n/a IMF
Liberia LIC AFR IDA HIPC 2003–2011 2006–2011 2006–2011 2006–2011 PRMED
Madagascar LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1998–2011 1998–2011 1998–2011 1998–2011 IMF x
Mali LIC AFR IDA HIPC 2008–2011 2000–2011 2000–2011 2000–2011 IMF x
Myanmar LIC EAP IDA 1989–2011 n/a n/a 1989–2011 IFS x x
Mozambique LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1999–2011 1999–2011 1999–2011 1999–2011 PRMED x
Mauritania LIC AFR IDA HIPC 2005–2011 2005–2011 2005–2011 2005–2011 PRMED x
Malawi LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1980–2011 1980–2011 1980–2011 2002–2011 PRMED x x x
Niger LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1998–2010 n/a 1998–2010 n/a PRMED x
Nepal LIC SA IDA 1986–2011 1986–2011 1986–2011 1986–2011 Website x x x
Rwanda LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1981–2011 1981–2011 1981–2011 1981–2011 Website x x x
Senegal LMIC AFR IDA HIPC 2002–2011 2002–2011 2002–2011 2002–2011 IMF x
Solomon Islands LMIC EAP IDA 1980–2011 1988–2011 1988–2011 1988–2011 Website x x x
Sierra Leone LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1978–2011 1978–2011 1978–2011 1978–2011 Website x x x
Chad LIC AFR IDA HIPC 2005–2011 2005–2011 2005–2011 2005–2011 IMF x
Togo LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1975–2011 n/a n/a 1975–2011 IFS x x
Tajikistan LIC ECA IDA 2001–2011 2001–2011 2001–2011 2001–2011 IMF x
Tanzania LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1979–2011 1981–2011 1979–2011 2000–2011 PRMED x x x
Uganda LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1978–2011 2002–2011 1978–2011 1978–2010 IMF x x
Vietnam LMIC EAP Blend 2000–2011 2000–2011 2000–2011 2000–2011 IMF x
Yemen LMIC MNA IDA 1996–2011 1996–2011 1996–2011 1996–2011 IMF x x x
Congo, Dem. LIC AFR IDA HIPC 2006–2011 n/a n/a n/a IMF
Zambia LMIC AFR IDA HIPC 1999–2011 2002–2011 2002–2011 2002–2011 PRMED x
Zimbabwe LIC AFR Blend 1981–2004 1981–2004 1981–2004 n/a Web-IMF
n/a means not available.
a Africa Region (AFR), East Asia & Pacific Region (EAP), Europe & Central Africa Region (ECA), Latin America & Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North Africa Region (MNA), and South Asia (SA).
b Domestic debt corresponds to Central Government, with the exception of Lao PDR (General Government), Niger (Public Sector), and Congo DCR (General Government).
c Domestic debt includes all financial liabilities defined by the GFSM (IMF, 2001), with the exception of Benin, Kenya, Kyrgyz, and Mauritania, whose definition includes only securities. For Benin and Mauritania,
there are no data available for other liabilities. For Kenya and Kyrgyz, other liabilities are negligible and not reported.
d Domestic debt is defined on a residency basis, with exception of Kenya, Nepal, Rwanda, Solomon Islands, and Yemen, where the currency basis is used because of their debt recording practices and data
constrains.
e Banking system is the only holder of domestic debt.
f There is no domestic market. Central Bank is the only holder of domestic debt.
g Banking system is the only holder of domestic debt.
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Table A3
LIC domestic public debt dataset – debt stock sample and debt structure sample.
Country name Debt
relief
Public debt in
2011 (percent of
GDP)
Domestic public debt
in 2011 (percent of
GDP)
External public
debt in 2011
(percent of GDP)
Variation in
public debt/GDP
in 1996–2011
(p.p.)
Variation in
domestic public
debt/GDP in
1996–2011
(p.p.)
Variation in
external public
debt/GDP in
1996–2011 (p.p.)
Pairwise correlation
between external
debt/GDP and domestic
debt/GDP in 1996–2011
Securities (percent
of domestic debt)a
Burundi HIPC 46.7 19.7 27.0 −91.1 9.3 −100.3 −0.3972 26
Comoros HIPC 51.2 6.2 44.9 −46.2 1.7 −47.9 −0.5552*
Eritrea HIPC 135.3 95.6 39.7 87.7 54.3 33.4 0.7503*
Ethiopia HIPC 32.2 14.2 18.1 −103.3 −10.0 −93.3 0.1783 51
Ghana HIPC 45.5 24.2 21.4 −36.7 8.9 −45.6 0.0523 99
Guinea HIPC 66.8 10.8 56.0 −15.0 7.9 −22.9 −0.4974* 23
Guinea Bissau HIPC 44.1 18.3 25.7 −276.2 12.2 −288.3 −0.7893* 0
Haiti HIPC 24.5 14.3 10.2 −14.0 1.3 −15.3 0.0761 0
Kenya 50.2 25.9 24.4 −6.9 12.1 −19.1 −0.5018* 100
Kyrgyz 53.6 4.1 49.5 16.6 −0.9 17.5 0.2531 100
Cambodia 31.2 0.5 30.6 −35.2 −1.8 −33.4 0.9728*
Myanmar 25.0 24.9 0.0 0.8 1.9 −1.1 0.2583
Malawi HIPC 43.3 22.9 20.4 −61.7 13.2 −74.8 −0.3846 89
Nepal 35.5 14.6 20.9 −31.8 −0.2 −31.5 0.4884 95
Rwanda HIPC 24.9 7.6 17.3 −64.6 −8.8 −55.8 0.6800* 58
Solomon Islands 23.7 5.5 18.2 −11.4 −11.8 0.4 0.5497* 52
Sierra Leone HIPC 61.4 15.0 46.5 −60.5 10.2 −70.7 0.0945 90
Togo HIPC 27.5 10.0 17.5 −72.7 3.3 −76.0 −0.8138*
Tanzania HIPC 39.5 9.9 29.6 −71.7 −8.7 −63.1 0.6393* 99
Uganda HIPC 28.9 9.8 19.1 −32.7 8.2 −41.0 0.7211*
Yemen 43.7 25.0 18.6 −30.2 23.5 −53.7 −0.5160* 88
Country name Loans (percent
of domestic
debt)a
Other accounts
payable (percent
of domestic debt)a
Other liabilities
(percent of
domestic debt)a
Long-term debt
(percent of
domestic debt)a
Short-term debt
(percent of
domestic debt)a
Non-classified
(percent of
domestic debt)a
Long-term debt
(percent of domestic
debt excluding
Central Bank
advances)a
Short-term debt
(percent of domestic
debt excluding
Central Bank
advances)a
assified (percent of
domestic debt
excluding Central
Bank advances)a
Burundi 0 61 13 67 20 13 8 57 35
Comoros
Eritrea
Ethiopia 0 49 0 82 18 0 62 38 0
Ghana 0 1 0 59 41 0 59 41 0
Guinea 0 77 0 77 23 0 0 100 0
Guinea Bissau 96 4 0 100 0 0 100 0 0
Haiti 0 100 0 100 0 0 0 0 0
Kenya 0 0 0 54 46 0 54 46 0
Kyrgyz 0 0 0 73 27 0 73 27 0
Cambodia
Myanmar
Malawi 3 8 0 21 76 3 14 83 3
Nepal 5 0 0 41 59 0 41 59 0
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